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Moral Blackmail* 
Terrance C. McConnell 
I 
As moral agents we must deal with the fact that many of our ethical 
decisions are made under imperfect conditions, and these imperfections 
may alter our actual obligations. If a person has done something wrong, 
he may incur a duty of reparation or a contrary-to-duty imperative; if an 
agent knows that he is weak-willed and will fail to do the morally ideal 
thing, his actual obligation may be altered so that he is only required to 
do the best that he can; and if, because of nonculpable ignorance, an 
agent cannot know that a certain act would be the morally ideal one, he 
may have no obligation to perform that act. 1 In each of these cases, the 
imperfection that alters the agent's obligation is his own -the fact that he 
has done a wrong act, the fact that he is weak willed and will not be able 
to avoid temptation, and the fact of his own ignorance. It would seem, 
though, that the imperfections of others might also alter one's obliga-
tions. Surely others' moral weakness affects one's own obligations; for 
example, one has an obligation not to leave confidential material lying on 
one's desk lest others be overcome by incontinence and look at it. 
Similarly, it would seem that the ignorance of others may affect one's 
obligations. At the very least, one might have an obligation to eliminate 
the ignorance by informing others. 
The intuitions are less clear, however, when we ask if the immoral 
actions of others might alter one's actual obligations. In particular, 
suppose that one agent, A, threatens to do some evil thing unless a 
• An earlier version of this paper was read at the University of Western Ontario and at 
Wake Forest University. I received many helpful comments from members of those 
audiences and from others who read this paper. I am especially indebted to Alan Donagan, 
Barry Hoffmaster, Ralph Kennedy, John King, Arnold Levison, Jan Narveson, John 
Stevens, and Laurence Thomas for their suggestions. 
1. The issue of contrary-to-duty imperatives was introduced by Roderick M. 
Chisholm in "Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic," Analysis 24 (1963): 33- 36. 
The question of whether one's own moral weakness can ,liter one's actual obligations is 
dealt with extensively by Holly S. Goldman in "Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection," 
PhiloSoPhical Review 85 (1976): 449-87. Whether one's own ignorance can affect one's 
obligations is discussed by many philosophers. For one example, see H. A. Prichard, "Duty 
and Ignorance of Fact," Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 
18-39. 
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second agent, B, does some less evil thing. Supposing that A has the 
power to and will carry out the threat unless B complies, does B have an 
obligation to do evil in order to prevent A's doing a greater evil? 
Ordinarily, of course, if one is forced to choose among evil alternatives, 
it is commonplace to say that one ought to do the least of the evils. What 
seems worrisome about the case in question, however, is that the 
contemplated action is ordinarily wrong and is presented as a possibly 
permissible alternative only because of someone else's wrong acts. Can 
one be morally required to do a normally evil thing simply because, 
unless one does, someone else will do something worse? Is the notion of 
"negative responsibility" in this context a morally sensible one?2 That we 
are at least suspicious that obligations can be altered by the immoral 
actions of others is made manifest by the fact that we are tempted to 
describe such cases as "moral blackmail." 
The question at issue here might be better illustrated if a specific 
case were presented. 
CASE 1: Certain citizens of country K have escaped and come to 
our country. They fled because of the repressive government of 
their native land. Believing that they are safe within our borders, 
they begin condemning the activities of the tyrant of K in order to 
call public attention to these atrocities. The tyrant cannot tolerate 
criticism, however, and he demands that our government seize 
these critics and turn them over to him. He threatens (and we have 
every reason to believe that he will carry out the threat) that unless 
this is done, his police will seize the members of our diplomatic staff 
in his country, of which there are many, and torture them. What 
should our government do?3 
It is reasonable to say that normally it would be wrong to return these 
few critics to the tyrant, since to do so will ensure that they will be 
tortured or killed. But in case 1, if we do not return them, a greater evil 
will be done, namely, more people will be tortured. In situations of this 
sort we are in a unique position to prevent someone from doing a 
greater evil, but only by doing a lesser evil ourselves. We have been 
placed in this unique position by someone else, someone who has 
directed his threat at us. Let us call situations of this sort cases of moral 
blackmail.4 
2. The concept of negative responsibility is discussed critically by Bernard Williams 
in "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. J. J. C. Smart and 
Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 93-118. For a 
defense of this notion, see John Harris, "The Marxist Conception of Violence," Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 3 (1974): 192- 220. 
3. Joel Feinberg discusses a case smiliar to this in Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 87. 
4. Some will say that a case of moral blackmail is an example of a genuine moral 
dilemma, that is, a situation in which an agent ought to do each of two acts both of which he 
cannot do. In case 1, it might be argued, no matter what the government does it will have 
done something wrong. In my "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics," Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 8 (1978): 269- 87, I have argued that an adequate moral theory must 
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We must ask, then, whether the immoral actions of a moral blackmailer 
can alter our actual obligations. There are two extreme theories on this 
question. The first theory states that one is never permitted to do 
something evil in order to prevent someone else from doing a greater 
evil. Kant seemed to have endorsed this first view (and hence I shall call 
it the Kantian theory) when he argued that one is not even permitted to 
lie to a would-be murderer concerning the whereabouts of his intended 
victim.s We might also call this the "clean-hands" thesis, since it asserts 
that one may not dirty one's own moral hands in order to prevent 
another from doing a greater wrong. Advocates of this theory are 
committed to the claim that there is a relevant difference between doing 
evil and allowing evil, and that one is not responsible for allowing evil if it 
can only be prevented by doing evil. The second theory holds that 
whenever one must do or allow some evil, one should always choose the 
lesser evil. If evil will occur no matter what one does, one's obligation is 
to see to it that the state of affairs involving the least possible evil is 
brought about. We might call this the "dirty-hands" thesis, since it is 
claimed that an agent is sometimes obligated to dirty his own moral 
hands in order to prevent another person from doing a greater evil. 6 On 
this view what is ethically important is not the agent's moral purity or 
integrity, but rather the value of the state of affairs brought about. Thus 
an agent is just as responsible for forbearing to prevent a greater evil as 
he is for doing an unnecessary evil. Utilitarians, of course, support this 
view, but some nonutilitarians do too. 
Though each of these extreme views has a number of advocates, 
neither seems to be plausible. In general, I think that one should be 
suspicious of normative principles that are as unqualified as these 
extreme ones are. But in this case we need to examine the particular 
theories. The Kantian view or clean-hands thesis is suspect because it 
ignores certain morally relevant features and thus sometimes yields 
counterintuitive judgments. In some cases, many people do think that 
one ought to do evil in order to prevent another person from doing 
rule out the possibility of genuine dilemmas. I shall assume, then, that whatever we say 
about cases of this sort, they do not present us with an irresolvable moral conflict. 
5. See Immanuel Kant, "On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent 
Motives," in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, ed. T. 
K. Abbott (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909), pp. 361-65. It may be somewhat 
misleading to call this view the "Kantian" theory since some commentators argue that 
Kant's ethical system did not commit him to this extreme position. On this point, see H. J. 
Paton, "An Alleged Right to Lie: A Problem in Kantian Ethics," Kant-Studien 45 
(1953-54): 190-203. 
6. Those who defend or seem to be committed to this view include Kai Nielsen, 
"Against Moral Conservatism," Ethics 82 (1972): 219-31; Michael Walzer, "Political 
Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," Philosr1Jhy and Public Affairs 2 (1973): 160- 80; and 
Bas C. van Fraassen, "Values and the Heart's Command," Journal of Philosr1Jhy 70 (1973): 
5-19. 
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something worse. 7 Ironically, Kant's own case seems to be a coun-
terexample to the Kantian thesis. 
CASE 2: Person A asks you where B is now. You know where B is, 
but it is obvious that A intends to kill or do serious harm to B. The 
only way that you can prevent this injury to B is by lying to A. Are 
you permitted to tell a lie? 
Surely what the agent ought to do in this situation is to lie to A, even 
though lying is normally impermissible. In fact, this case is often cited to 
show that there are exceptions to moral rules or that the same action-
type can be right in one situation but wrong in another. 8 Another case 
that casts doubt on the Kantian view is taken from Shakespeare's 
Measurefor Measure. 
CASE 3: Angelo, the head of the city's ,government, unjustly 
condemns to death one of his subjects, Claudio, for the crime of 
lechery. Isabella, Claudio's sister, goes to Angelo and pleads for her 
brother's life. She is a devoutly religious person. Angelo agrees to 
free Claudio, but only on the condition that Isabella have sexual 
intercourse with him. So apparently she can save her brother's life 
only by allowing herself to be sexually exploited. 
I have not described this case entirely accurately. In the play Isabella 
does find a way to save Claudio without yielding to Angelo. However, it 
is still important to consider this case because when first confronted with 
the decision, Isabella has reason to believe this is the only way to save her 
brother; in addition, the case I describe is just as possible as the one that 
unfolds in the play. Whether Isabella is morally required to succumb to 
Angelo's demands is not obvious. Allowing oneself to be treated in such a 
way does, after all, involve a great sacrifice. It does seem reasonable to 
say, however, that it would not be wrong for Isabella to take these steps 
in order to save Claudio. I say this, not because of a liberal attitude 
toward sexual morality, but because of what will be lost if she fails to take 
these steps, namely, a man's life.9 Since the first theory entails that such 
an act would be wrong (because Isabella would be "giving in" to evil), one 
has reason to believe that the theory is inadequate. 
Let us consider one other case that raises problems for the clean-
hands theory, a case that is not hypothetical. 
CASE 4: The Hanafi Muslims seize control of a public building in 
Washington and hold 130 people as hostages. They threaten to kill 
7. Here and elsewhere in the paper I do not mean to suggest that there is a common 
set of intuitions concerning the cases I discuss. Certainly there is no such consensus. In 
justifying the particular judgments that I make, I shall call attention to considerations that 
are morally relevant but which are ignored by the extreme theories. 
8. See Paul W. Taylor, Principles of Ethics (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing 
Co., 1975), p. 2. 
9. In short, I (and I believe many other people) put a higher value on preventing an 
unjust killing than I put on resisting sexual exploitation. I realize that, as a sixteenth-
century Catholic, Isabella's views may have been somewhat different. 
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all of the hostages (and we have every reason to believe that they 
will) unless their demands are met. They demand that the movie 
Mohammad, Messenger of God be taken off the market because, they 
say, it is blasphemous. Should we agree to their demand? 
Suppose that this were the only demand that the terrorists made. If it 
were, many would agree that the movie ought to be temporarily 
removed from the market in order to save the lives of 130 people. This is 
so even though it is normally wrong to restrict people's freedom or to 
engage in censorship. Again, the Kantian view denies that we ought to 
give in to the terrorists' demands. Certainly, according to that theory, 
one may not harm innocent persons in order to prevent another from 
doing a greater evil. This, I think, casts serious doubt on the view. 
This may lead one to believe that the second theory, the dirty-hands 
thesis, is correct. This theory does yield judgments that a number of 
people are inclined to endorse in cases 2,3, and 4. However, the theory 
yields less palatable judgments in some other cases. Consider a more 
detailed and historically accurate description of case 4 (which I shall call 
the extended version of case 4). The Hanafi Muslims make an additional 
demand-that the five Black Muslims convicted for the massacre of a 
family at the Hanafi headquarters be turned over to them so that they 
can "settle the score" or "get their justice." If the Black Muslims are given 
to the Hanafis, we know (let us assume) that they will be killed; but if we 
fail to do this, we know that many of the 130 hostages will be killed. The 
second theory, then, would require us to hand over the persons; in this 
case, the loss of five lives is the lesser evil. 10 Yet it can be argued that 
giving in to the demand is wrong. Not only does it make a mockery of the 
ideal of rule by law, but doing something which one knows will lead to 
the torture and death of others under such circumstances is surely 
impermissible. In this case, numbers do not matter. It seems reasonable 
to say, then, that this demand ought to be rejected. The implications of 
the second theory are even more worrisome in the following case. 
CASE 5: Person A holds a gun at your head. He threatens to kill 
you and your two children (and you have every reason to believe 
that he will) unless you kill person B, an innocent party against 
whom A holds a grudge. May you kill B in order to save yourself 
and your children? 
As the case is described, no matter what the agent does, evil will occur. If 
the agent does nothing, three people will be killed. But if the agent 
complies with A's command, only one person will be killed. Since the 
lesser evil is the death of one person, the second theory requires that the 
10. One qualification must be made here. We must assume that this act will not lead to 
more evil-for example, the loss of even more lives-because of the precedent that it sets. 
As D. H. Hodgson points out in Consequences of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1967), pp. 77-78, there is a real danger that we shall encourage acts of this sort by 
complying with the demands. We can imagine, of course, that the negotiations in case 4 
take place in private and that the settlement is not known to the public. 
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agent dirty his own hands in order to prevent A from doing a greater 
evil. This, however, seems morally unacceptable. Since in this case the 
agent must kill B in order to save his own life, some might describe the 
act as one of self-defense. But even if this were granted, there are moral 
limits on what one may do to defend oneself. The mere fact that A's 
continued existence poses a threat to the life of B does not justify B's 
talking the life of A. Person A may be an innocent party, and it is hard to 
see how killing an innocent person can correctly be described as a case of 
justified self-defense. ll Once again we have reason to doubt the ade-
quacy of the second theory. 
The problem of how cases of moral blackmail may affect one's actual 
obligations is now clear. There are some situations where it can plausibly 
be argued that one ought to do something evil in order to prevent the 
moral blackmailer from doing a greater evil. There are other situations, 
however, where no matter how great the evil is that one can prevent, 
what one must do in order to prevent it is impermissible. The Kantian 
theory does not allow for cases of the first kind, and the dirty-hands 
thesis rules out the possibility of situations of the latter sort. Thus each of 
the extreme views -seems to be incorrect. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean 
Ethics (3, I, IllOa25- 30), seems to have recognized the inadequacy of 
the extreme views. There he suggests that we rightly excuse a person 
when he is forced by another to do something evil in order to save his own 
life or the lives of his children. But, he says, some acts are so evil that no 
matter what the other person threatens to do, one is not permitted to do 
what he demands. Aristotle suggests that killing one's own mother is an 
example of such an impermissible act. The challenge, of course, is to 
formulate a principle to handle cases of this sort. Relying on intuitions 
will not always do, since there are a number of cases about which we are 
uncertain. What is needed is a compromise theory, a principle which is 
free from the defects of the extreme theories and which enables us to 
resolve the difficult cases. If no such principle exists, some of us will be in 
the awkward position of being forced to abandon some moral judgments 
that seem quite defensible, no matter which of the extreme theories we 
opt for. To the difficult task of constructing such a principle we now 
turn. 
III 
There does seem to be something initially appealing about the Kantian 
view. To all but the act utilitarian, the dirty-hands thesis must seem 
suspect. But what is it about the extreme version of the dirty-hands thesis 
that seems implausible? In the extended version of case 4, the theory 
11. For a defense of this claim, see Baruch A. Brody; "Abortion and the Sanctity of 
Human Life," American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973): 133-39, see esp. p. 134. See also 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971): 
47-66, see esp. p. 53; and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1974), pp. 62-63. 
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requires that we relinquish the five Black Muslims to the Hanafis, even 
though we know that this will result in their being tortured and killed. 
This is wrong, at least in part, because the Black Muslims are being 
treated as a means only, as the Kantian might put it. The situation is 
similar in case 5. To kill person B would prevent a greater evil-namely, 
the deaths ofthree people-but this would be a blatant case of using B as 
a means only. In each of these cases, if the agent were to do what was 
necessary to prevent the greater evil, he himself would be violating the 
rights of some innocent party (whose rights would not be violated if he 
did nothing). 
Yet, as we saw, there are cases that cast doubt on the clean-hands 
thesis as well. In case 2 it is surely permissible for the agent to lie to A in 
order to prevent him from killing B. Here A is the "victim" of the agent's 
act, but of course he is not an inn.ocent party. In this situation, we do not 
owe A the truth. A's rights have not been violated; either he has forfeited 
his rights or they have been overridden. 12 In case 3 Isabella may comply 
with Angelo's demands in order to save Cluadio. Since she is the agent 
who is allowing evil to occur in order to prevent a greater evil and she is 
the victim too, she is surely permitted to make such a sacrifice if she 
wishes. She is not violating one of her own rights (if such talk even makes 
sense), though of course Angelo is doing something wrong. Case 4 may 
seem more troublesome. In cases 2 and 3 the agent who does or allows 
the evil is not violating some innocent party's rights. But in case 4 the 
rights of some innocent party are being tampered with, namely, the 
rights of those who own and are showing the movie. We are harming 
some innocent party in order to ,prevent other parties from suffering 
more. Why is such an act permissible in this case but not in the others? 
What makes case 4 different from the extended version of that case or 
from case 5? Though in each of these cases one can prevent a greater evil 
only by violating the rights of some innocent person, the rights to be 
violated in the latter two cases seem to be qualitatively more important 
than the right at issue in case 4. The rights in the latter two cases are ones 
to which we attach a much greater strength. And with respect to these 
examples, why we attach these differing strengths seems clear enough. 
In case 4 we can easily compensate the injured parties for their losses, 
financial and otherwise. This is not the case, though, when what the 
victim loses is his life. When the right to life is at stake, compensating the 
victim for his loss is not an option. This seems to be an important and 
morally relevant difference. 
12. Some who hold that human rights are absolute think that there is a problem with 
saying that rights can be forfeited or overridden. As an alternative, one might adopt a view 
suggested by A. I. Meldon in his Rights and Persons (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977), pp. 61-62. Meldon argues that one's right to truthfulness presupposes that 
the interests one will pursue are not morally objectionable; that is, one has a right to the 
truth only if one will not use this information to further one's pursuit of immoral projects. 
According to Meldon's view, the would-be murderer never had the right to be told the 
truth. 
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Having seen, at least in part, why the extreme versions of the 
Kantian theory and the dirty-hands thesis are inadequate, we are in a 
position to formulate a principle which remedies these inadequacies. Let 
us consider the following principle (P) as an alternative to these views. 
An agent in a situation of moral blackmail may do something evil in 
order to prevent the blackmailer from doing a greater evil just in 
case either (1) the agent's action does not irreparably violate the 
rights of some nonconsenting, innocent person, and if an innocent 
person's rights are violated he is to be compensated, or (2) if a 
nonconsenting, innocent person's rights are irreparably violated, 
then the same (or equally strong) rights of that same person would 
have been violated even if the agent did not comply with the 
blackmailer's demand.13 
An explanation of principle (P) is in order here. First, (P) is a strong 
principle in that it sets out both necessary and sufficient conditions for 
when it is permissible to comply with the demands of a moral 
blackmailer. Next, it is important to note that principle (P) allows an 
agent to violate an innocent person's rights on the condition that it is 
necessary to prevent the moral blackmailer from doing a greater evil. 
Some might claim that it is always permissible to violate another person's 
rights provided that the violator fully compensates the victim. However, 
it has been argued-persuasively, I think-that this view must be 
rejected. 14 Principle (P) does not give one such a wholesale license to do 
evil. Third, the qualification "innocent person" is included to allow that 
evil, even irreparable evil, may be done to a person in order to prevent 
that same person (or one conspiring with that person) from doing evil to 
someone else. It is to this intuition that the Kantian view runs counter, 
for it even forbids one to lie to a would-be murderer. Fourth, the 
qualification "non consenting" is included because if a person chooses to 
sacrifice himself in order to prevent the blackmailer from doing a 
greater evil, it is reasonable to say that he may do so, even if the harm he 
suffers is irreparable. Such an act of martyrdom is not only not 
impermissible, it seems to be above and beyond the call of duty, and any 
plausible moral principle must allow for such acts. 
The fifth point of explanation concerns the requirement of com-
pensation. Principle (P) permits an agent to violate the rights of a 
13. In The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1977), Alan 
Donagan mentions a thesis somewhat similar to clause 1 of principle (P). He says, "As a 
rough generalization, you may, under coercion, be an involuntary accomplice (in the 
colloquial sense of 'involuntary') to a wrong, provided that your action does not 
irreparably violate what is due to some human being as such" (p. 173). Donagan, however, 
neither explains nor defends this thesis. Moreover, it is not clear whether he is providing 
necessary and sufficient conditions for when such acts are permissible, or merely sufficient 
conditions (depending on how one construes "provided that"). Finally, things that he says 
elsewhere in the book suggest that he is sympathetic with what I call the Kantian theory. 
See pp. 146-47, pp. 207- 8, and his discussion of the Pauline principle, esp. pp. 149-57. 
14. Nozick, chap. 4, esp. pp. 65-71. 
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nonconsenting, innocent person if that person can be compensated for 
that right-violation. This clause is necessary in order to avoid the 
objectionable consequence of the dirty-hands thesis, the consequence 
that an innocent person may be sacrificed or treated as a means only 
simply to avoid a greater evil. It may be that principle (P) still allows 
some innocent people to be treated as a means only, but in requiring that 
amends be made the force of this objection is considerably diminished. 
Finally, the notion of an irreparable violation of a person's rights must be 
explained. There are two different senses in which a violation of rights 
might be irreparable, what I shall call the strong and weak senses. A 
violation of rights is irreparable in the strong sense if the victim cannot 
be compensated in any way for his loss. To cite an obvious example, if a 
person's right to life is violated, no compensation for the victim is 
possible. If irreversible psychosurgery is performed on a normal person 
(against his will) transforming him into a raving madman, this violation 
of rights would be irreparable in the strong sense. A violation of rights is 
irreparable in the weak sense if the victim can be compensated to some 
degree, but cannot be adequately compensated. For example, a person 
may possess a painting which he regards as priceless, perhaps because it 
was painted by Rembrandt, the person's favorite painter. Similarly, an 
object may be irreplaceable to a person because of its history, for 
example, an heirloom. The owner has a right to these objects, and if they 
are taken from him adequate compensation cannot be made. However, 
some compensation can be offered. Money will not buy the original 
Rembrandt that was lost, but it will buy something of similar value. It 
should be noted that the distinction between the strong and weak senses 
of irreparability is not based on the actual preferences of the victim; that 
is, it is not the victim who determines whether any compensation at all is 
possible. One reason for this is that in some cases we may have to decide 
whether to comply with the blackmailer's demands without knowing 
what those preferences are. Another reason is that we may regard those 
preferences as irrational. For example, we would regard the movie 
owners (in case 4) as quite unreasonable if they claimed they could not be 
compensated in any way for the temporary seizure of their film. If a 
person is alive and well-off enough to enjoy the things he normally does, 
then it seems reasonable to say that the person can in some way be 
compensated. Clearly, if a person is killed, permanently turned into a 
madman, or has all of his limbs severed, he cannot enjoy many of the 
things that he normally would. 
One of the intuitions underlying principle (P) is that some rights are 
so strong that they ought to be protected even if the only means for 
doing so involves violating someone else's weaker rights. Since we do 
regard rights the violation of which is irreparable in the strong sense as 
qualitatively more important than those whose violation is irreparable 
only in the weak sense, in (P) the term "irreparable" is being used in the 
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strong sense. 15 So principle (P) does not protect an innocent person's 
possessions which he deems priceless. The justification for this is not that 
such property rights are unimportant; clearly, they are important. But 
these rights are not as strong as, say, the right to life of other innocent 
persons. Thus if we must choose between complying with the moral 
blackmailer's demands and giving him some innocent person's original 
Rembrandt or allowing him to kill some innocent people, we may take 
the former course of action if we compensate, to the degree possible, the 
owner of the painting. (Clause [2] of principle [PJ will be explained in 
Section IV.) 
As the preceding remarks suggest, one of the strengths of principle 
(P) is that it is free of the defects that plague the extreme theories; it 
takes account of morally relevant factors ignored by those views. The 
principle implies that in case 2 it is permissible to lie to person A because 
he is not an innocent victim. Since he intends to kill B, his right to be told 
the truth has been overridden or forfeited. Concerning case 3, (P) does 
not forbid Isabella to allow herself to be used as a sexual object in order 
to free Claudio (assuming that she cannot free him in any other way). 
Though she is innocent and ought not to be harmed, she may, if she 
wishes, choose to suffer in order to save her brother. And if we apply the 
principle to case 4, we may stop the showing of Mohammad, Messenger of 
God in order to save the lives of the 130 hostages. We are required, 
however, to make amends to those who own and profit from the showing 
of the movie. In this case the compensation would presumably be 
monetary. When we consider the extended version of case 4, however, 
(P) forbids us to comply with the dema~lds of the terrorists. Since 
turning over the prisoners to the Hanafi Muslims will have as a direct 
consequence their being tortured and killed (we shall assume), to comply 
would irreparably violate their rights. More to the point, this violation 
would be ensured by our act, and it is this that (P) forbids. For similar 
reasons, it would be wrong to do the evil demanded of the agent in case 
5. If we kill person B, we will have irreparably violated one of his rights. 
So such an act is forbidden to us, even though someone else will 
irreparably violate the rights of three people. Thus principle (P) takes 
into account certain moral distinctions that seem quite important, 
distinctions that the two extreme theories neglect. 
There are, however, other reasons for accepting (P). This principle 
is, for the most part, consistent with the natural rights tradition. While 
no complete analysis of natural rights can be given here, we can say that 
15. I have said that a violation of rights is irreparable in the strong sense if the victim 
cannot be compensated in any way for his loss. A brief explanation is needed here. It must 
be the case that he cannot be compensated because of the very nature of the right violated 
and not because of some contingent fact. For example, if I steal a dollar from Jones and he 
dies in the next hour, I cannot in any way compensate him for the loss of the dollar. But 
this is the result of a fortuitous circumstance, and not because of the nature of the act. 
554 Ethics July 1981 
minimally rights are entitlements, or that rights are claims one has 
against others. Rights put legitimate restraints on the actions of others; 
they put a strict limit on what others may do to us. Moreover, the 
possession of natural rights in no way depends on the political institu-
tions or the social order of which one is a part. When a person possesses 
rights, this imposes obligations on others. One of the fundamental 
features of rights is that they protect the individual against utility-
maximizing claims. 16 There are certain things that may not be done to 
the individual, even in the name of maximizing the good. The pro-
hibition against knowingly punishing an innocent person in order to 
prevent some great evil, such as a riot, is a classic example. If a person 
were always permitted to do evil in order to prevent someone else from 
doing a greater evil, the possession of rights would be of little value, or at 
least their value would be considerably less. Part of the appeal of 
principle (P), then, is that it does, at least in part, protect one's rights 
against utility-maximizing claims. 
There is an objection to this, however. It might be claimed that 
principle (P) ignores the rights of the parties who will be harmed by the 
immoral actions of others. And since they are the greater number, or at 
least the evil done to them is greater, this objection seems to have some 
point. One defender of the dirty-hands thesis states this objection 
forcefully: "But cannot the compliment [of inhumanity] be returned by 
speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of 
those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then 
excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and 
misery but merely forebore to prevent it?"17 The response to this 
objection should make the intuition behind principle (P) clearer. The 
rights of those being harmed are not ignored. The advocate of principle 
(P) would of course acknowledge that the rights of the victims have been 
violated. However, the point is that the rights of other innocent people 
put a strict limit on what may be done to prevent others from violating 
someone's rights. Clearly a society should protect its citizens against the 
crimes in question, such as murder and torture. But just as surely it may 
not ignore the rights of innocent individuals in trying to fulfill this 
obligation. This same point can be made another way. Suppose that the 
moral blackmailer will torture A and B unless the agent in question 
tortures C. According to (P), it would be wrong to comply with these 
demands. Notice that if the agent were to comply with the demands, C 
would have a legitimate grievance against that agent. That agent would 
be the one who irreparably violated C's rights. If the agent does not give 
in to the demands, however, A and B do not have a complaint against 
him, or at least their complaint is not of the same magnitude as C's would 
be. This might suggest (but does not imply) that negative rights (e.g., the 
16. This is argued by Alan H. Goldman, "Rights, Utilities, and Contracts," Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 3, suppl. (1977): 121-35. 
17. Nielsen, pp. 229-30. 
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right not to be killed) take precedence over positive rights (e.g., the right 
to be protected against harm) in cases of conflict. 1s There is, however, no 
need to endorse this general thesis here. 
However, principle (P) does not go as far as some defenders of the 
natural rights tradition. Most notably, it does not go as far in defending 
natural rights as libertarians do. Some would say that a person's rights 
may never be violated, even if compensation is paid, unless the person 
consents to the act (and then it is no longer a violation of his rights). 
Robert Nozick considers the hypothesis that all violations of rights (what 
he calls "border crossings") should be prohibited, but rejects this because 
some boundary crossings with compensation pay their own way; that is, 
their benefits are very great. But Nozick still places strict limits on when 
such boundary crossings may occur. "Any border-crossing act which 
permissibly may be done provided compensation is paid afterwards will 
be one to which prior consent is impossible or very costly to nego-
tiate .... "19 On Nozick's view, then, even if one sufficiently compen-
sates a person for a border-crossing act, that act will be wrong unless 
the victim's prior consent was impossible or very costly to obtain. One 
may note how this contrasts with principle (P) by examining case 4. This 
is the case in which the Hanafi Muslims will kill 130 people unless a 
movie to which they have strong religious objections is removed from the 
market. Suppose that those who own and profit from the showing of the 
movie protest. It is, after all, their property. Would we not be violating 
their rights to seize the movie, even if the confiscation is temporary and 
the owners are adequately compensated (for their inconvenience as well 
as loss of profits)? On Nozick's view, taking the movie off the market 
would be an impermissible boundary crossing. Clearly, obtaining prior 
consent was possible (i.e., we could easily contact and talk to the owners) 
and not very costly. So if the owners refuse to stop showing the movie in 
order to save the 130 hostages, we may not force them to do so. Principle 
(P), however, allows us to force the owners to stop showing the movie (at 
least temporarily) provided that we adequately compensate them. In this 
case I believe that principle (P) better matches the considered moral 
judgments of most people than does Nozick's view. So though (P) does 
not go as far in protecting our rights as some would, this is not a 
weakness but rather a strength of the view. 
There is an obvious problem that must be mentioned at this point. It 
is suggested by my acceptance of principle (P) that some acts irreparably 
violate another person's rights (in the strong sense), while other border 
crossings are such that the victim can be compensated, sometimes 
adequately and sometimes only to some degree. But this raises an 
obvious question. How can one tell when a violation of a person's rights 
18. This thesis is defended by Philippa Foot in "The Problem of Abortion and the 
Doctrine of Double Effect," in Moral Problems, ed. James Rachels, 2d ed. (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1975). 
19. Nozick, p. 72. 
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is compensable and when it is not compensable? What is the criterion for 
determining whether amends can be made? Furthermore, how does one 
tell what sort of compensation is appropriate if one admits that adequate 
compensation cannot be made? No answer to these difficult and impor-
tant questions will be provided here. The examples given, though, do 
show that there are clear instances of all three types of cases: ones in 
which the person whose rights are violated can be fully compensated, 
ones in which he can be compensated only to some degree, and ones in 
which the victim cannot be compensated at all. One might infer from the 
examples given that property rights are compensable and that personal 
rights are not. Such an account, however, is surely too simple. 20 It may be 
that a complete theory of rights is needed before one has a principled 
way of determining when compensation can be made and when it 
cannot. The task of providing such a theory, however, is not one that I 
shall pursue in this paper. 
IV 
The last clause of principle (P) must now be explained. This clause states 
that one is permitted to violate irreparably the rights of some noncon-
senting, innocent person in order to prevent a moral blackmailer from 
doing an even greater evil just in case the same (or an equally strong) 
right of that same person would be violated even if the agent failed to 
comply with the blackmailer's demand.21 The reason for this clause is 
simple enough. If the rights of some person A will be irreparably 
violated even if one does not comply with the demand, then if one's 
being the agent of the harm done to A will prevent a much greater evil, it 
seems reasonable that that is what one ought to do. Let us consider a case 
to illustrate this. 
CASE 6: Jim, having gotten lost while on a botanical expedition, 
finds himself in the central square of a South American town. 
Twenty Indians are about to be killed in order to deter other 
Indians from protesting against the government. Since Jim is an 
honored guest, the captain of the soldiers offers him an alternative: 
if Jim will kill one of the Indians himself, the others will be allowed 
to go free; if Jim refuses, all twenty will be killed. Short of killing 
the one, there is nothing that Jim can do to stop the captain. The 
20. It might also be tempting to say that in cases of conflict personal rights always 
override property rights. This view, however, is also much too simple, as is shown in 
Feinberg, pp. 76-77 (see n. 3 above). 
21. Some claim that whenever an agent does an act that is normally evil he does some 
damage to his moral character. Such an act makes one more callous, it is argued. This is 
especially so if the act involves irreparably harming some innocent person. Though I think 
that these claims are considerably exaggerated, I need not take a stand on the issue here. 
We may simply stipulate that when we consider whether a certain act, x, really does prevent 
a greater evil, our determination of this will include the damage, if any, that the character 
of the agent of x suffers. 
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twenty and the other villagers understand the situation, and they 
obviously want Jim to accept. What should he do?22 
If Jim does nothing, all twenty of the Indians will be killed by the 
captain; however, if Jim kills one of the Indians, the others will be freed 
unharmed. His only other alternative, trying to seize the weapon and 
save all of the Indians, will result in his own death as well as that of the 
twenty. Hence principle (P) entails that Jim may kill the one even though 
this irreparably violates his rights. 
In a case such as this, one is tempted to say that there is some sense 
in which Jim is not really violating the victim's rights. He did not create 
the situation. Nevertheless since killing is such a serious act, one may 
wonder how it could ever be permissible. This can best be answered if we 
look at the case through the eyes of the twenty. In particular, we must 
ask what sort of complaint the twenty Indians have and against whom. 
Clearly, they have a legitimate complaint against the captain. It is he who 
has put their lives in danger without just cause. Because of the actions of 
the captain, no matter what Jim does, some evil consequences will ensue. 
But the Indians have no complaint against Jim (assuming, as we do, that 
there is nothing that he can do to save all twenty). After the captain has 
made his declaration, the best state of affairs possible is the death of one 
of the Indians. Since the death of one Indian is inevitable and since if 
Jim does nothing that same Indian plus the other nineteen will die, jim's 
agreeing to execute the one seems to be the right act to do. In fact, each 
of the twenty desperately wants Jim to accept this "privilege" that 
honored guests are accorded. In some sense, then, the one killed has 
consented to jim's killing him. So even the one Jim chooses to kill (or 
relatives of that one) will have no complaint against Jim, at least if we 
assume that he uses some random method to select his victim. The victim 
has lost nothing that he would not have lost had Jim not complied with 
the blackmailer's demand. Normally, of course, that the victim con-
sented is neither ajustification nor an excuse for murder. But in extreme 
circumstances such as these, I think that it is reasonable to regard the 
victim's consent as justificatory grounds for the act of killing. Notice, for 
example, that some who would ordinarily reject this reasoning approve 
of voluntary euthanasia when the person to be killed will die soon 
anyway. Thus, that the victim's same rights will be violated even if Jim 
does not comply with the demands of the blackmailer seems to provide 
grounds for altering our judgment significantly. 
It is important to note that the last clause of principle (P) does not 
entail that an agent may kill any person who is going to die soon anyway 
to prevent the blackmailer from doing a greater evil. The nature of the 
cause of the person's death is morally relevant. Baruch Brody, in 
discussing the question of when it is permissible to kill an innocent 
22. This is a slightly modified version of a case presented by Williams, pp. 98- 99 (see 
n. 2 above). 
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person, worries about the following type of case: a situation in which we 
can prevent five people from being blown up by a bomb only by blowing 
up the bomb's triggering mechanism, thereby killing one innocent 
person who is not one of the five but who will die soon anyway from 
cancer. Brody thinks that we have conflicting intuitions about such a 
case. On the one hand, it seems that killing the person in order to save 
the five lives is permissible since he will die soon anyway. On the other 
hand, the nature of the cause of his death seems to be relevant, and this 
would suggest that killing this innocent person would be wrong. With 
some hesitation, Brody concludes that what is more important is that the 
agent will die soon anyway, and therefore killing him to prevent a 
greater evil is permissible.23 Brody's account is a general one intended to 
deal with all cases of permissible killing. I am only concerned with 
situations of moral blackmail, and in these cases principle (P) yields 
different results than Brody's view. According to principle (P) it would 
be wrong to kill a person or otherwise irreparably violate his rights 
unless the same rights of that person would be violated even if the agent 
did not comply with the blackmailer's demands. If the moral blackmailer 
demanded that we kill some innocent person whose rights would not 
otherwise be violated but who was going to die soon anyway from natural 
causes, principle (P) would forbid such an action. Dying from natural 
causes does not violate one's rights. 
It is not easy, I think, to choose between principle (P) and Brody's 
view. Let us examine the implications of the views, however, by consider-
ing the following. 
CASE 7: A small village is surrounded by a group of brigands who 
demand that the villagers kill Joe, an innocent member of the 
village whom the brigands dislike. If the villagers fail to comply 
with this demand, the brigands threaten to (and the villagers have 
every reason to believe that they will) destroy the village and 
everyone in it, including Joe. The village is cut off from outside 
help and giving in to their demands is the only way to save the 
village. 24 
Though this is a difficult case, if these really are the only alternatives 
open to the villagers, I believe that many do think that they are 
permitted to kill Joe. Brody agrees. But consider a modified version of 
case 7. Suppose again that the brigands demand that the villagers kill 
Joe. If they do not comply with the demand, the brigands will kill the five 
village leaders (and this does not include Joe). And, as it happens, Joe 
has cancer and will die in six months anyway. In this situation it can be 
argued that the villagers ought not to comply with the demands of the 
brigands. Even though giving in to their demands would prevent a 
23. Brody, pp. 138-39. This particular case, of course, is not one of moral blackmail. 
24. Ibid., p. 136. 
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greater evil, it is reasonable to say that it would be wrong to do SO.25 Joe 
has a right to live out the remaining few weeks of his life. Of course, we 
think that Joe would be a splendid person if he would volunteer to have 
his life ended prematurely in order to save the five leaders. However, 
this is not something that we may force him to do. If the line of 
argument presented here is plausible, it lends support to my claim that 
what is morally important (at least in situations of moral blackmail) is 
whether the same (or equally strong) rights of the same person will be 
violated anyway, and not whether the person will die soon. 
One serious question remains concerning the last clause of principle 
(P). How can an agent ever know that no matter what he does, the rights 
of some innocent person will be irreparably violated? How can Jim 
know, for example, that were he not to comply with the captain's 
demand the person he executes would have been killed anyway? Some 
might say that since Jim can never know that he will fail, he should at least 
try to seize the captain's weapon in order to save all twenty, and he 
should do this even if it happens to turn out that all twenty-one of them 
are killed. When the other alternatives open to one are as evil as they are 
in this case, one should always try to do the ideal act. There are two 
different ways to respond to this objection. One response is to point out 
that the last clause of principle (P) tells an agent what he ought to do if in 
fact the same rights of that same person will be violated anyway. The 
problem of the agent's knowing the relevant facts is independent of the 
adequacy of principle (P). There is, however, another response that one 
can make. Principle (P) can be altered so that it tells an agent what he 
ought to do given the evidence that is available to him. Thus if an agent 
had reason to believe that he could save all twenty of the Indians, though 
in fact he could not, the revised version of (P) would allow him to try to 
save all twenty. Even if this is granted, though, there can still be cases in 
which the evidence available to the agent indicates that saving all twenty 
is not an option open to him. In this case, he would have to make the 
same difficult choice as before, and the revised version of (P) would say 
that he is permitted to kill the one. That agents must sometimes act 
without knowledge of all the relevant facts is itself a case where moral 
decisions must be made under imperfect conditions. Since it is desirable 
not to beg any questions about what an agent's obligations are under 
such conditions, I shall simply point out that principle (P) may be stated 
in two ways: either an agent's obligations depend on what in fact will 
occur, or his obligations depend on what he has good reason to believe 
will occur. 
25. This clause of principle (P) has the controversial consequence that Joe may not be 
killed even if all of the other villagers (but not Joe) will be killed by the blackmailer. I accept 
this consequence, and simply acknowledge that further discussion of the extreme "end of 
the world" type of situation is needed. 
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Principle (P) tells us when it is permissible to comply with the demands 
of a moral blackmailer. More specifically, (P) states under what condi-
tions it is permissible to do evil in order to prevent the blackmailer from 
doing a greater evil. One must ask, though, whether the fact that the 
actions of a moral blackmailer are involved presents a special problem. 
One can imagine a number of situations involving natural disasters such 
as disease, famine, and drought where an agent can prevent a greater 
evil only by doing something that is normally wrong. Consider the 
following (artificial) example. 
CASE 8: A huge rock, jarred loose by a tremor, is rolling down the 
hill. If it continues on its present course, it will kill twenty people. 
Fortunately the course of the rock can be diverted; unfortunately 
the only way it can be diverted is such that two, and only two, 
different people will be killed by it. What should some observer do 
if he is the only person who has the power to divert the course of 
the rock? 
In this case one can prevent the deaths of twenty people only by doing 
something that will cause the deaths of two other innocent people. Are 
cases such as this one any different in principle from those that involve 
immoral actions on the part of others? Bernard Williams, with his 
emphasis on the distinction and possible conflict between one's own 
projects and the projects of others, suggests (but does not develop the 
point) that these two types of cases are importantly different. 26 Critics of 
Williams, however, have thought that this is absurd. "Other people's 
projects must, after all, be seen simply as a class of need-creating 
circumstances and must, for the purposes of moral decision-making ... , 
be treated simply as features of a brutal world, like famine and 
disease."27 There seems to be something appealing about the position of 
the critic. If a person is about to be harmed and we can prevent it only by 
harming someone else, what moral difference does it make whether the 
source of the harm is someone else's wrong actions or nature? 
Yet in spite of the apparent plausibility of the critic's claim, it can be 
argued that there is a moral difference between situations of moral 
blackmail and those where the source of evil is nature. The following two 
examples call attention to this moral difference. Consider case 4 again. 
Surely in that situation it is permissible to seize the movie from its owners 
in order to save the lives of the hostages (provided that we compensate 
the owners). But consider an analogous case. Suppose that we could 
prevent considerable suffering-perhaps even save some lives-by seiz-
ing the profits of one who owns a movie and using them to buy food for 
some suffering from famine. In this case the source of evil is a natural 
26. Williams, pp. 109-1S. 
27. John Harris, "Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity," Philosophical 
Quarterly 24 (1974): 265-73, see esp. p. 273. 
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disaster, yet it seems wrong to alleviate the suffering in this way. Thus 
there seems to be a moral difference in the two types of cases. It will be 
helpful if we can say why there is such a difference. On what are these 
different judgments based? In case 4 we are permitted to seize the movie 
to protect the stronger rights of the innocent hostages. If we do not do 
this, they will be killed. Not only do they have a right not to be harmed, 
but they also have a right to be protected against such border crossings. 
In the other case, however, what is at issue is the right to be aided or the 
claim to beneficence. Some (e.g., libertarians) would deny that there is a 
general right to beneficence. But even if there is such a right, it is 
reasonable to maintain that this right is not as strong as the right not to 
be harmed. The difference in strength of these two rights explains, at 
least in part, why there is a moral difference between these two cases. 
When the source of evil is nature, the potential victims will not have their 
rights violated. In cases of moral blackmail, however, the would-be 
victims will have their rights violated. In the two cases under considera-
tion, there is a second important difference. In case 4 the burden of 
ensuring the safety of the hostages is borne solely by the owners of the 
movie only temporarily. When they are compensated for their loss, the 
burden is distributed evenly. In the case of saving the victims of famine, 
however, the burden will be borne solely by those whose profits are 
seized. Such an action would be unfair, and if we permitted it one's 
property rights would become useless. 
Let us consider another pair of cases to illustrate further the 
difference between situations of moral blackmail and those where the 
source of evil is nature. Case 8 provides us with an example where the 
source of evil is a natural disaster. Some people agree that the observer is 
permitted to divert the course of the rock in order to save the twenty. 
Consider an analogous case, though, where the source of evil is a moral 
blackmailer. Suppose that the blackmailer demands that we kill a certain 
person or he will kill his twenty hostages. Surely it can be argued that it 
would be wrong to comply with this demand; note the earlier discussion 
of the extended version of case 4 and of case 5 (in Section II). Again, we 
need to ask what justification there is for judging these cases differently. 
The key to the difference between case 8 and the analogous case 
involving moral blackmail is an understanding of the rights of the 
would-be victims. As case 8 is described, neither the twenty nor the two 
have more of a claim against being crushed by the rock. Because of this, 
the observer may act to save the greater number. One might wonder, 
then, whether all cases involving natural evils should be handled by 
utilitarian reasoning. It can be shown, I think, that they should not. We 
can imagine a more detailed description of case 8 that would suggest that 
one group had a stronger claim than the other. Suppose that the twenty 
were in an area marked Danger-Falling Rocks and that the two were in 
a safety zone. In such a situation, I think, the observer is not permitted to 
divert the course of the rock. But unless such special conditions obtain, 
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the observer may act to save the twenty.28 In the case of moral blackmail, 
however, an agent would be violating an innocent person's rights if he 
killed him. His failure to kill the one will lead to twenty innocent people's 
being killed, but the source of the threat to them is quite different from 
the threat he would pose to the one. The source is someone else's evil 
action. The one person does have a claim against the agent, and his claim 
is stronger than the claim the twenty have against that same agent to be 
saved; or rather, his claim is stronger when the agent's saving the twenty 
will irreparably violate his rights. So there are important differences 
between cases of moral blackmail and situations involving natural evils. 
It might be thought that the crucial feature about cases of moral 
blackmail is that they involve the immoral actions of others. There are, 
however, reasons to doubt this. Consider the following case, originally 
presented by Judith Jarvis Thomson. 
CASE 9: Harry is President and has just been told that the Russians 
have launched an atom bomb toward New York. The only way in 
which the bomb can be prevented from reaching New York is by 
deflecting it, but the only deflection path available will take the 
bomb to Worcester. Harry can do nothing, letting all of New York 
die; or he can press a button, deflecting the bomb and killing all of 
Worcester.29 
As Thomson remarks, many people think that Harry is permitted to 
deflect the bomb in this case. This is certainly a situation where the 
immoral actions of others are involved, but the agents in question are not 
blackmailing anyone; they are doing their own dirty work. But consider 
an analogue of case 9 that does involve moral blackmail. If someone 
demands that we kill the citizens of Worcester or he will kill the citizens 
of New York, it seems plausible to say that it is wrong for us to comply 
with this demand even though the act would prevent an evil exactly as 
great as the one that Harry can prevent in case 9. I, at least, have 
different intuitions about these two cases. How might one justify such 
different judgments about these cases?30 Though in each case the 
immoral actions of others are involved, the conditions or circumstances 
of the two cases are different. For reasons that are not always easy to 
explain, we are especially repulsed by the idea of one moral agent 
manipulating the other. This, of course, is what happens in cases of 
moral blackmail. The blackmailer attempts to get a person to do certain 
acts by threatening to do something much worse. To the extent that the 
person complies with these demands, he is surrendering his moral 
28. My remarks about case 8 follow the same line developed by Judith Jarvis 
Thomson in "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem," Monist 59 (1976): 204- 17. 
29. Ibid., p. 208. 
30. Thomson's explanation of the moral difference between these two cases is 
(presumably) that in situations like case 9 we are doing something to the object of threat, 
not to people; but in the analogue of that case we would be doing something to people 
(ibid .• p. 216). 
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autonomy. He is, in a sense, a puppet in the blackmailer's hands. 
Blackmail situations are characterized by manipulation via threat, and 
this feature is not present in a situation like case 9. In that case one 
encounters the actual wrong actions of others as a condition of the world 
to be taken into account; in cases of moral blackmail the possible wrong 
acts of others are directed toward an agent as a threat.31 Though much 
more needs to be said about this, this difference does seem to be a 
morally relevant one. But if the manipulation of the blackmailer is so 
bad, one might ask, why is it ever permissible to comply with his 
demands? As long as amends can be made for the (normally wrong) act 
that the agent performs, giving in to the demands does not seem so bad; 
or at least it is worth it to prevent a greater evil. If one can restore moral 
order, the effects of the manipulation are minimal. However, if no 
amends can be made or if the moral order cannot be restored, the line 
must be drawn. That degree of moral manipulation cannot be tolerated 
no matter how great the evil is that the blackmailer will bring about. 
If what I have argued is correct, situations of moral blackmail 
cannot be indiscriminately treated as one among many kinds of cases 
where the agent can prevent a greater evil only by doing evil. Cases of 
moral blackmail differ in important ways from those where the source of 
evil is nature, and surprisingly they also differ from situations involving 
the immoral actions of other persons not engaged in moral blackmail. As 
a result, the moral principle(s) governing the actions of the victim of 
moral blackmail will be different from those governing other situations 
where one can prevent a greater evil. 
VI 
Principle (P), as it is now stated, indicates the conditions under which it is 
permissible for an agent to do something evil in order to prevent a moral 
blackmailer from doing a greater evil. One may wonder, though, 
whether this version of the principle is not too weak. Should we not say 
that when the conditions stated in the principle obtain, one is morally 
required to prevent the greater evil? Consider first the case in which 
other innocent people suffer when the agent does evil in order to 
prevent someone else from doing a greater evil. This sort of situation is 
depicted in case 4. If the agent complies with the demands of the Hanafi 
Muslims, other innocent persons will be harmed, though not irrepara-
bly. In this case it does seem that the agent is obligated, not merely 
permitted, to do that which is necessary to save the hostages. The rights 
of the hostages that are at stake are so strong that we ought to do all that 
31. In case 9 the immoral action of another is a condition for one's own act in that the 
action (or perhaps we should say its effects) is already in progress. Another type of 
situation different from cases of moral blackmail is that in which one knows (or has good 
reason to believe) that someone else will do something wrong if he gets in a certain 
position, and one can prevent the act from occurring only by getting in the position oneself 
and doing something less evil. An excellent example of such a case is presented by 
Williams, pp. 97-98. 
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we can to protect them, short of violating another person's equally 
strong right. But there is also an obligation to make amends to the 
innocent parties who are harmed. Even the libertarian, who denies that 
there is a general duty of beneficence, acknowledges that there is an 
obligation (at least for those acting on behalf of the state) to prevent 
violations of rights. Protecting one's rights is important enough to allow 
some evil to be done, provided that those who are harmed are compen-
sated. It does seem, however, that the agent in question should not be 
required to bear the full burden of compensation. On whom does this 
obligation fall? Clearly, if possible, the moral blackmailer should be 
forced to compensate the innocent victim. But if that is not possible, then 
this is an obligation that should fall on society as a whole. Some 
particular individual is required to do evil in order to prevent the 
blackmailer from doing a greater evil because he is in a unique position 
to do so. This is not normally the case, though, when it comes to com-
pensating those harmed. And there is an obvious sense in which every-
one benefits from the practice of protecting one's rights even if some-
thing evil must be done. Such a practice will serve to protect better 
the strongest and most important rights of everyone. So it is plausible to 
say that, in cases like this, one is required to comply with the demands of 
the blackmailer. 
Consider now the case where the agent who does the evil in order to 
prevent a greater evil is also the innocent person who will suffer. Case 3 
provides such an example. As I describe the case, Isabella must do 
something which will bring harm to herself so that Claudio's life will be 
spared. Do we want to say that she is morally required to do the act, or 
merely that doing such an act is permissible? There seem to be good 
reasons for one to balk at saying that the agent is obligated to perform 
such an act. We do have the concept of a supererogatory act, an act that 
is above and beyond the call of duty. Typically a supererogatory act is 
one that requires a great sacrifice on the part of the agent, a sacrifice so 
great that while we characterize the act as one that is morally ideal, we 
think that it is unreasonable to say that the act is required. Some might 
claim that in any situation where the agent of an act will be harmed it is 
implausible to say that the act is morally required. To be sure, it is 
argued, if the act will prevent a greater evil, it would be a good thing for 
the agent to do it. But agents cannot be obligated to do acts that will 
harm themselves; such acts are permissible, but not required. This 
position, I think, is incorrect. Surely agents are sometimes required to do 
acts that involve some harm to themselves. In fact, it has been argued 
that it is implausible to distinguish acts that are obligatory from those 
that are supererogatory in terms of the degree of harm that is done to 
the agent because sometimes the performance of duty requires a great 
sacrifice and some acts of supererogation are trifling. 32 The story of 
Captain Oates provides an example of the former. 
32. This is argued by Roderick M. Chisholm in "Supererogation and Offence," Ratio 
5 (1963): 1-14, see esp. pp. 3-4. 
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CASE 10: Captain Oates was a member of Robert Scott's expedi-
tion. As Oates and his companions were returning from the South 
Pole, the Captain had an accident and was disabled. The group was 
far from the depot which was their only source of food and shelter. 
It was obvious to all that if the others continued to help Oates, none 
would make it back safely. However, if Oates would detach himself 
from the group (an act that would ensure a quick death for him), 
the others would have a chance to return safely. What should 
Captain Oates do? 
As those familiar with this story know, Oates did detach himself from the 
group, but, tragically, his companions did not survive. It is nevertheless 
interesting to consider the case as it is stated because it is likely that the 
evidence available to Oates indicated that his companions might survive; 
moreover, we can easily imagine a case that differs from the actual one in 
the respect that the companions do survive, and considering such a case 
may be instructive. In circumstances such as these, I want to argue, it is 
reasonable to say that Oates is morally required to detach himself from 
the group, in spite of the fact that such an act will lead to his death. 
Though such an act might well be described as heroic, it is still plausible 
to say that it is his duty and not a supererogatory act. If this is correct, 
then in some circumstances one can be morally required to make great 
sacrifices, and so one cannot object to the strengthened version of 
principle (P) on the general grounds that no agent can be required to do 
something that will result in harm to himself. 
Of course, not everyone agrees with my judgment about the Oates 
case. 33 The critic might argue that the harm that Oates will suffer is 
irreparable harm-the end of his life-and any principle which requires 
an agent to do something which will result in irreparable harm to himself 
is much too austere. In the abstract, this might seem correct. In this 
particular case, however, I think that it can be argued that Oates is 
required to separate himself from the others. It is a crucial and morally 
relevant fact, I believe, that the same irreparable harm will come to 
Oates no matter what he does. Whether he leaves the group or not, he 
will die soon. So just as principle (P) forbids one to do evil in order to 
prevent a greater evil if doing so irreparably violates some other 
nonconsenting, innocent person's rights, so too it does not normally 
require an agent to do an act that will result in irreparable harm to 
himself. But in each case there is an exception. If the party in 
question-either some innocent person or the agent himself-will suffer 
the same irreparable harm no matter what the agent does, then this evil 
must be done to prevent a greater evil. 34 
33. See, for example, W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday & Co., 1970), pp. 220-22. 
34. Two points of explanation must be made. First, one might think that since the 
situations of Joe (in the modified version of case 7) and Captain Oates are apparently 
analogous, the judgments I have made in these two cases are inconsistent. There are, 
however, important differences. In case 7 I was discussing the obligation of others' 
responding to the demand to kill Joe; in case 10 I am discussing the obligation of Oates. In 
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In concluding, there are two related objections to the strengthened 
version of principle (P) that must be considered. First, it might be 
thought that the principle requires too much. Consider case 7, the 
situation in which the villagers are ordered to kill Joe or the entire village 
will be destroyed. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that the population 
of the village is twenty adults. Now, the objection goes, surely if all 
twenty agree to fight the brigands in spite of the odds, they are 
permitted to do so. But the strengthened version of (P) does not allow 
this, since the same rights of the same person (Joe) will be irreparably 
violated even if they do not comply with the demands. This objection can 
be answered, however. The new principle can be stated so that one is 
required to prevent the blackmailer from doing a greater evil only if his 
original victims (i.e., those whom he threatens to harm if one does not 
comply) are nonconsenting. If his would-be victims agree to fight it out 
to the bitter end, they have a right to do so. In this case the villagers are 
the potential victims, and if they prefer to oppose the blackmailer rather 
than kill Joe, they may do so. 
The second objection is that the principle forbids too much. 
Suppose in the extended version of case 4 that the Black Muslims 
volunteer to be turned over to the Hanafis in order to save the hostages. 
If we comply with the demand, they will be harmed irreparably. But this 
would not be the case if we failed to comply with the demand. So the 
strengthened version of principle (P) forbids us to comply with the 
demand. Yet surely if the Black Muslims volunteer to be traded for the 
130 hostages, it would be permissible to comply. The response to this 
objection is that the strengthened version of principle (P) does not 
forbid us to comply with the blackmailer's demands in these cir-
cumstances.35 Both clauses of the principle are stated so that one is 
allowed to prevent a greater evil if the innocent parties (other than the 
original victims) whose rights will be violated consent to this. The 
principle does not forbid such acts of herosim. 
The question discussed in this essay is to what extent, if any, the 
actions of a moral blackmailer might affect one's actual obligations. It has 
been argued that each of the extreme theories -the Kantian theory and 
the dirty-hands thesis-is inadequate. Each of these views overlooks 
some morally relevant factors. A theory which does not ignore these 
factors and which can be defended on independent grounds is a 
strengthened version of principle (P), principle (Pi), which we may now 
state as follows: 
addition, case 7 is one of moral blackmail and case 10 is not, and, as I have argued, that 
sometimes makes a moral difference. Second, Isabella ought to comply with the demand of 
Angelo only on the assumption that the harm she will suffer is not irreparable. I realize 
that victims of sexual exploitation sometimes do suffer irreparably, and Isabella might be 
particularly susceptible to this. 
35. This act will be permitted, though, only if it really does prevent a greater evil. 
Again, we will have to take into account the possible bad consequences of setting a 
precedent of this sort. 
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An agent in a situation of moral blackmail is morally required to do 
something evil in order to prevent the blackmailer from doing a 
greater evil (to nonconsenting persons) just in case either (1) the 
agent's action does not irreparably violate the rights of some 
nonconsenting, innocent person, and if an innocent person's rights 
are violated he is to be compensated, or (2) if a nonconsenting, 
innocent person's rights are irreparably violated by the agent's 
action, then the same (or equally strong) rights of that same person 
would have been violated even if the agent did not comply with the 
blackmailer's demand. 
